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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A LITIGATION-ORIENTED APPROACH TO TEACHING FEDERAL
COURTS

MICHAEL L. WELLS*

INTRODUCTION
Back in the day when Critical Legal Studies was riding high, one of its
avatars ridiculed the course on Federal Courts, calling it “the purest of
contentless legalist rituals, in which all ‘policy’ arguments are grounded in
funhouse mirror versions of Competence and Federalism whether they can
conceivably be brought to bear on particular cases or not.”1 Mark Kelman’s
putdown should not be taken too seriously. Twenty five years later, Critical
Legal Studies has largely disintegrated,2 while Federal Courts remains a key
course in law school curriculums. I suspect, however, that many law students
would agree, at least in some measure, with Professor Kelman’s
characterization. In my contribution to the symposium, I wish to argue that the
traditional way of teaching Federal Courts, which draws heavily on ideas
embodied in a fifty-five year old casebook, no longer serves the interests of
law students as well as it once did. As an alternative, I propose an approach
that emphasizes the knowledge and understanding that students will need in
order to become effective litigators.
I. TWO WAYS OF TEACHING FEDERAL COURTS
A.

The Legal Process Method

In 1953, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler published The Federal Courts
and the Federal System3 and revolutionized the teaching of Federal Courts.
* University of Georgia Law School. The author wishes to thank Bill Marshall and Gene Nichol
for helpful comments on a draft.
1. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319 n.65 (1984).
2. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 9 (1997) (“The social/
political/intellectual network that ‘was’ cls in the late 1970s and early 1980s came apart in the
late 1980s . . . . But there are various successor networks that are as active as ever.”); Robert C.
Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 525 n.21,
527 (2000) (citation study documenting “the rise and fall of Critical Legal Studies”).
3. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953).
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Their emphasis on “the distribution of power between the states and the federal
government,”4 “what courts are good for,” and “the whole range of questions
as to the appropriate relationship between the federal courts and other organs
of federal and state government”5 marked a striking departure from earlier
works, which had concentrated on federal procedure. Along with another set
of materials Hart prepared in collaboration with Albert Sacks,6 The Federal
Courts “defin[ed] what has come to be one of the most important schools of
legal thought in late twentieth–century America, typically described as ‘the
legal process school.’”7 The Legal Process and the “Hart & Wechsler
Paradigm” “focus[] primary attention on who is, or ought, to make a given
legal decision, and how that decision is, or ought, to be made.”8 This model
soon became the dominant mode for both teaching and scholarship in Federal
Courts law.9 At most schools, the course began to focus on the distribution of
decision-making authority among the branches of the national government and
between the states and the federal government. Judging by the organization
and content of Federal Courts casebooks, this dominance continues today.
In Hart and Wechsler, now in its sixth edition,10 and in other casebooks
that follow its approach,11 the threshold question is “[t]he [n]ature of the
[f]ederal [j]udicial [f]unction,”12 and the ways by which the scope and limits of
federal judicial power are manifested in the doctrines of standing to sue and the
justiciability of a given dispute. The power of Congress to regulate federal
judicial power comes close behind.13 These matters of basic theory are
followed by examinations of narrower distribution-of-authority issues. Here,
the books diverge on the sequence in which these matters are treated. Hart and

4. Id. at xi.
5. Id. at xii.
6. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994). The book circulated in manuscript form for thirty-six years before its publication. See id.
at xi.
7. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (book review).
8. Id.
9. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 953, 956 (“Hart and Wechsler defined the field as we now know it . . . .”).
10. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed.
2009).
11. See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERNBERG, C. KEITH WINGATE & DONALD H. ZEIGLER,
FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS (4th ed. 2008); see also MARTIN
H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS (6th ed. 2007).
12. FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 49.
13. Id. at 319; DOERNBERG, WINGATE & ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 163; REDISH &
SHERRY, supra note 11, at 106.
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Wechsler begins with the Supreme Court’s role in reviewing the state courts,14
the scope of federal common law making,15 federal district court jurisdiction,16
federal judicial control over state governments,17 sources of friction between
federal and state courts, and ways of minimizing that friction.18
A premise underlying the examination of all of these topics is that “the
central, organizing question of Federal Courts doctrine involves allocations of
authority.”19 Some of these allocation issues are, so to speak, horizontal (i.e.,
they concern the distribution of power among the Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Branches). Others are vertical, in that they focus on state/federal
relationships. What all of them have in common is that they can usefully be
addressed by relegating issues of substantive federal law to secondary status.
Richard Fallon, the leading academic spokesman for the Hart and Wechsler
approach, acknowledges that such matters have some bearing on the allocation
issues.20 Still, the premise that ties the field together is the “principle of
institutional settlement,” which holds that courts can identify and implement
trans-substantive principles for allocating decision making among the
institutions of government,21 and de-emphasizes the role of substantive
values.22 Taking this premise as their starting point, many of the finest minds
in the legal profession have found Federal Courts to be the most intellectually
stimulating course in law school, and a number of them have gone on to
become scholarly experts in the field.23

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 431.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 1013 (abstention doctrines), 1153 (habeas corpus), 1311 (res judicata).
Fallon, supra note 9, at 962.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Comparing Federal Courts “Paradigms,” 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 3, 6 (1995) (“[T]he richness of the Legal Process approach resides in its sensitivity to
the subtle interactions of and overlap between substantive and procedural interests in
jurisdictional decisions.”).
21. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The
Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2045 (1994) (discussing the crucial role of institutional
settlement in Hart and Sacks’s Legal Process materials); Fallon, supra note 9, at 964 n.48
(discussing the principle of institutional settlement and its key role in the Hart and Wechsler
approach to Federal Courts law).
22. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 2050 (“The principle of institutional
settlement suggested that legal process thinkers did not consider substantive fairness to be a
primary element of political legitimacy.”).
23. See Amar, supra note 7, at 691–93 (discussing scholars and scholarship inspired by the
Hart and Wechsler casebook).
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The Litigation-Oriented Approach

There is, however, another way to address the subject matter of Federal
Courts, one that favors practical utility over academic theory. I favor a
perspective that, for the lack of a better term, I shall call a “litigation-oriented
approach.” What I mean by this term is that the course concentrates on
examining questions that would interest lawyers in their professional lives.
These questions include, among others: “What are the opportunities for
litigating a given dispute in federal court?”; “What obstacles may stand in the
way?”; “What distinctive doctrines does one need to know in order to litigate
federal claims, especially federal constitutional claims?”; “What types of
problems come up when one litigates in state court?”; and “What are the
advantages and disadvantages of litigating in federal rather than state court?”
This way of treating Federal Courts does not pay close and sustained
attention to such “Hart and Wechsler” questions as these: “What is the role of
the federal courts in our system of separation of powers?”; “Should the federal
courts be used to reform society through public law litigation, and if so, how?”;
“What principles of federalism should courts use to resolve conflicts between
federal courts and state governments?” The choice of one set of inquiries
rather than another is one of emphasis. The latter set of questions certainly
needs to be addressed in order to understand the cases. Unlike the treatment
they receive under Hart and Wechsler, however, they are not framed as
freestanding topics. Instead, they are viewed as sources for arguments as to
how to answer the issues a litigator is concerned with. By contrast, my sense is
that in many Federal Courts courses that take Hart and Wechsler as their
guide, the emphasis is reversed: the issues of interest to litigators are taken as
occasions for taking up these larger issues of federalism and separation of
powers.
II. HOW A LITIGATION-ORIENTED APPROACH WORKS
This difference in emphasis leads to a difference in the organization of the
course. A course that follows the model set out in The Federal Courts and the
Federal System would begin with questions about the role of federal courts in
our system. But from a litigation-oriented perspective, the most important
question is how one gets into federal court. The main federal statute for
litigating constitutional challenges to state action is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Yet
examination of this statute is deferred until one is deeply into the course, after
a thorough immersion in these general allocation-of-power principles.24 In this
conception of the course, the cause of action authorized by § 1983 is treated as

24. The current edition of Hart and Wechsler reaches § 1983 in the middle of chapter 9, after
devoting over nine hundred pages to other matters. See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER &
SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 942.
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nothing more than a manifestation of the general principles governing the
relations between the federal courts, on the one hand, and state officers and
local governments on the other. Other books follow more or less the same
structure.25 Some give § 1983 only perfunctory treatment while others provide
extensive coverage.26 But for all of them, the premise behind organizing the
course in this way seems to be that general propositions should come first,
followed, if the teacher is so inclined, by the (comparatively less significant)
particulars of § 1983 litigation. My sense is that most current casebook
authors simply follow the path blazed by Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler in
1953, before the rise of § 1983 and the rest of the modern law of constitutional
litigation.
A.

Beginning with § 1983

My litigation-oriented Federal Courts course starts from the opposite
premise. It begins with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then moves on to federal common
law, federal question jurisdiction, standing, sovereign immunity, abstention,
federal law in the state courts, Supreme Court review, habeas corpus, and
concludes with the highly abstract, theoretically important, but largely
unresolved issues raised by Congress’s Article III power over the federal
courts.27 Section 1983 comes first because anyone who litigates in federal
court will benefit from knowing it thoroughly. It is the statutory source of the
cause of action litigants ordinarily use in order to challenge state action on
federal constitutional (and some statutory) grounds. We study it not only
because it is important in its own right, but also because § 1983 litigation is the
context in which the Court typically addresses pressing questions of judicial
federalism and because it provides a template for federal litigation which,
once mastered, can readily be adapted to other contexts as well. Section 1983
is a powerful tool that, in my view, every future litigator should learn about in
law school. It should be studied in Federal Courts because, in practice, many
of the other doctrines examined in the course—including justiciability and
standing, sovereign immunity, abstention, and res judicata—typically arise in

25. See, e.g., DOERNBERG, WINGATE & ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 509 (chapter 6 examines
§ 1983); REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 11, at 303 (chapter 6).
26. Though PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS (6th ed. 2008), arrives at § 1983 rather late in the day, they accord it
an especially detailed treatment. See id. at 1151–1379 (chapter 9). At the other extreme, in one
casebook, § 1983 and Supreme Court cases interpreting it receive only passing mention in a
footnote. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, JOHN B. OAKLEY & DEBRA LYN BASSETT, FEDERAL
COURTS 530–31 n.7 (12th ed. 2008).
27. My organization of the course follows the casebook on which I collaborate with two
distinguished Federal Courts teachers. See MICHAEL L. WELLS, WILLIAM P. MARSHALL &
LARRY W. YACKLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (2007). The opinions
expressed in this paper, however, are solely my own.
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the course of a § 1983 suit. Studying § 1983 at the outset gives students the
context necessary for understanding how those doctrines actually work.
For these reasons we begin the course by discussing the breadth of the
cause of action recognized in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape,28 the leading modern
case that revived the long-dormant statute. We then move on to limits on §
1983 recovery, including the official immunity doctrine that precludes the
award of damages in many situations29 and the rejection of vicarious liability
for municipalities in Monell v. Department of Social Services.30 The
discussion turns next to such matters as the opportunities left open by Monell
for suing municipalities,31 and the prospects for using § 1983 to enforce federal
statutes.32 In the course of examining these matters, we stress the differences
between the “offensive” remedy provided by the statute and “defensive”
remedies of the kind that are typically available in the criminal process. It
becomes evident that offensive remedies existed long before the rise of § 1983,
going back at least to Ex parte Young.33 Students learn that these offensive
remedies raise a host of new questions that they may not have encountered in
either Criminal Procedure or Constitutional Law. The discussion of official
immunity, in turn, highlights the differences between two kinds of offensive
remedies—prospective and retrospective. While immunity is rarely a problem
when a prospective remedy is sought, it is a significant obstacle to
retrospective relief.
Introducing the prospective-retrospective remedy
distinction early on provides necessary background for elaborating on the
strengths and weaknesses of the two remedies later on in discussions of
standing, sovereign immunity, and abstention.
Though the course begins with § 1983, it is not a “civil rights” course. The
“federal courts” focus soon becomes apparent as we use the statute as a bridge
to take us to federal common law. Section 1983 speaks in sweeping terms.
Unlike modern statutes, it ignores most of the issues that arise in litigation.
The gaps in the text invite a discussion of the process by which the Supreme
Court fills in the gaps, and that analysis provides students with a concrete
illustration of federal common law, situated in a context they fully understand.
Given the highly abstract issues raised by the formation of federal common
law, the pedagogical utility of the § 1983 example is considerable.

28. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
29. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07 (1982).
30. 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978).
31. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).
32. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005); Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002).
33. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For pre-Young developments, see Ann Woolhandler, The Common
Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L. J. 77 (1997).
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Our examination of judge-made law in § 1983 lays a foundation for
turning to a more systematic treatment of federal common law. Just as the
courts must make a considerable amount of federal law in § 1983 litigation, the
same need for federal common lawmaking arises in other contexts for a
number of distinct reasons. By now we have left § 1983 behind and are
dealing with general problems of judicial federalism. The focus here is on
when and why courts should make federal common law. Accordingly, one of
the aims of examining federal common law is to identify as concretely as
possible what those reasons are. These intensely practical issues can be
addressed quite successfully without a detailed examination of United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin,34 Swift v. Tyson,35 or even Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.36 Here, as throughout the course, emphasis should be placed on the
exposition of the doctrine. To that end, Justice Marshall’s opinion for the
Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,37 which is a model of clarity,
should be highlighted rather than buried in the notes, as it is in Hart and
Wechsler.38
Studying the remedial law developed under § 1983 at the beginning of the
course lays the groundwork for identifying another link between § 1983 and
federal common law. Besides substantive law, there is a remedial dimension
to federal common law, illustrated by the cause of action for Fourth
Amendment violations recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.39 This aspect of federal common law provides
an opportunity to illustrate the differences between constitutional litigation and
federal statutory litigation, where access to an implied remedy is quite
limited.40 On the constitutional side, the Bivens remedy against federal
authorities dovetails with the § 1983 remedy against state officers and local
governments. By studying the foundations for Bivens, students enhance their
understanding of the policy rationale for Monroe, a rationale that is not fully
articulated in Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Monroe.
We then put aside for a time the distinctive features of constitutional
litigation and move to a higher level of generality, examining the availability
of federal district court for federal question and diversity cases. Here, too, the
focus of attention is on the aspects of the doctrine that matter to someone who

34. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); see FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note
10, at 608.
35. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note
10, at 550.
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at
558.
37. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
38. See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 628.
39. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
40. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).
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may actually use it to get into or stay out of federal court. With that goal in
mind, American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.41 should receive
comparatively more attention and doctrines like the “well-pleaded complaint”
rule should take a back seat. The point is that there is no modern case at odds
with the affirmative principle for which American Well Works stands—that a
litigant asserting a federal cause of action will have access to federal court.42
Taking that rock solid principle as a starting point clarifies the issues raised by
other cases as to whether and when a litigant may get to federal court even
though his cause of action is created by state law. The possible exceptions can
then be identified with some specificity and taken up one at a time: (a) the
principle illustrated by Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Engineering & Manufacturing that “a federal court ought [sometimes] to be
able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on
substantial questions of federal law,”43 so long as (b) the federal issue appears
on the face of a well-pleaded complaint;44 (c) the limits on the well-pleaded
complaint principle, for example, where the federal issue appears on the face
of a compulsory counterclaim,45 or where the litigation is for a declaratory
judgment;46 and (d) the principle that the plaintiff is ordinarily, but not always,
“the master of the complaint.”47
All of these matters concern the statutory scope of federal jurisdiction. For
several reasons, the constitutional issue of how far Congress may go under
Article III in expanding federal jurisdiction ought to be saved for later in the
course. One reason for putting the constitutional issue elsewhere is that some
students are confused by the juxtaposition of materials on the constitutional
issue, which generally recognize broad congressional power, and the limits
imposed by the jurisdictional statutes and the Court’s interpretation of them.
In addition, the constitutional issue has little practical significance, as very few
real-world jurisdictional issues involve a need to determine the outer limits of
Congress’s power. Finally, the “outer bounds” issue has more in common with
other Article III issues, notably Congress’s power to restrict federal
jurisdiction in favor of either the state courts or non-Article III federal
tribunals.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

241 U.S. 257 (1916).
Id. at 259–60.
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830–32 (2002).
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1983).
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6–8 (2003).
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Discussing Potential Obstacles to Federal Court Access

Having examined the primary vehicles for obtaining access to federal court
for federal questions in general and constitutional claims in particular, we turn
to a variety of obstacles that may arise, principally but not exclusively in
constitutional cases. I begin with justiciability and standing to sue. Here, we
have one of the big differences between a litigation-oriented approach and the
traditional organization of a Federal Courts course. In the latter, the center of
attention in cases on justiciability and standing is the separation of powers
between the Executive, Congress, and the federal judiciary. The “case”
requirement of Article III defines the boundaries of judicial power, and the task
at hand is to identify the attributes of a “case.” When one does this at the
outset of the course, as in Hart and Wechsler, students must undertake that
project as though it were a freestanding inquiry with, for all they know,
significant implications for a wide range of disputes. Lacking grounding in the
standard principles of constitutional litigation, they do not have a firm idea as
to what is, and is not, at stake in deciding standing and justiciability issues.
In my view, it is more effective simply as a matter of pedagogy to take up
these matters after studying § 1983. By the time one arrives at standing and
justiciability, students already understand that these obstacles only apply to
suits seeking prospective relief. Litigants who can show past injury will have
access to federal court at least for their damages claims.48 They are also
familiar with the limits on the utility of damages actions and can appreciate the
factors that give rise to efforts to obtain prospective relief. They have
encountered enough examples of constitutional litigation to have learned that
in the ordinary course of things persons complaining about government action
that adversely affects them will have no difficulty with standing and
justiciability. Knowing the basics equips them to appreciate the range of
circumstances, involving widely shared or hypothetical or arguably dated
harms that give rise to justiciability and standing problems. They are familiar
with the terrain and can quickly grasp the means one may employ to avoid
many of the problems. Thus, the issue of congressional power to confer
standing is an interesting and important one, but students should learn that
sometimes there are ways to sidestep the problem altogether. For example, the
plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife evidently could have established
“injury” without Congress’s aid by buying plane tickets to visit the
environmentally sensitive areas they were concerned about.49 The ripeness
issue raised by an anticipatory challenge to an enforcement statute may be
avoided by asking the prosecutor what he would do in the event of a violation.

48. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
49. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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Sovereign immunity is another obstacle to winning a federal constitutional
or statutory challenge. In the traditional approach to Federal Courts law, this
topic is treated as a major issue in federal-state relations. One discusses the
nature of sovereignty, the lessons of history, and the significance of the
adoption of the original Constitution and of the post-Civil War amendments.
As a matter of theory, it is hard to argue with this way of dealing with the area,
for Supreme Court decisions according constitutional status to sovereign
immunity do in fact shield state governments from suit for violations of federal
law. But, theory is one thing and practice is another. In the everyday world of
litigation, the doctrine has less impact than the theory behind it may imply.50
Students who have become familiar with § 1983 know going into the chapter
that, with very few exceptions, the doctrine does not apply to suits against local
governments and officials. They have learned that a suit for prospective relief,
aimed at the state officials who administer the relevant state law, can assure
state compliance with federal mandates going forward. They see sovereign
immunity for what it is—a barrier to obtaining backward-looking relief against
a state government. In my teaching experience, this ability to situate the
doctrine in real world remedial context significantly aids students in
understanding and evaluating the Eleventh Amendment case law.
Litigants who avoid both justiciability and sovereign immunity problems
may still have to contend with abstention, res judicata, and related doctrines.
The abstention doctrine from Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.
needs to be examined,51 but that doctrine receives somewhat different
treatment under my approach than in the Hart and Wechsler paradigm. For a
devotee of Hart and Wechsler, Pullman is an archetypal case. It has a
complex, trans-substantive Legal Process-based underpinning, drawing on the
principle that state courts should decide state law issues as well as the policy of
avoiding unnecessary constitutional rulings. The whole Pullman doctrine is a
feast for anyone interested in the principles of federalism and separation of
powers, with its referral to state court, its requirement that the litigants reserve
their right to return to federal court, and its questions as to what happens if
state courts balk at doing just what they are told and no more. Unsurprisingly,
Hart and Wechsler lavishes attention on it.52 But in practice, the Pullman
doctrine has been largely superceded by the practice of certification, which is
both broader in scope (applying to state law as well as federal issues) and less

50. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The
Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 215 (2006);
Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Effective Alternatives to Causes of Action Barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 715, 727 (2006).
51. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
52. See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO , supra note 10, at 1057–72.
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complex in operation (one simply sends a letter to the state court).53 Burford,54
Colorado River,55 Thibodaux,56 the anti-injunction act,57 and other narrow
abstention doctrines come next.
The most complex and important abstention doctrine, of course, is the one
set forth in its modern form in Younger v. Harris.58 Here again, studying §
1983 first has pedagogical advantages. A student who reads Younger without
first having mastered § 1983 may infer from the Younger Court’s rhetoric
about “comity” and “Our Federalism”59 that state courts are the favored forums
for constitutional claims. At any rate, that is the inference I drew when I read
the case as a student. In my course, however, students are better prepared to
put the case in proper perspective because they learn the first week of class that
exhaustion of state remedies is not required before bringing a § 1983 suit. It is
easy for them to grasp that despite Younger’s rhetoric, efforts to apply its
principle outside the context of pending state proceedings of some kind have
generally fallen short. With the basic principle in place, one achieves clarity in
presenting the doctrine by minimizing discussion of history and theory in favor
of identifying obstacles and opportunities available to litigants. To that end,
we organize the examination of Younger by identifying the variety of
circumstances that may count in either aiding or hindering access to federal
court and by taking them up one at a time.
The ultimate impact of Younger can be grasped only by understanding how
it works in combination with the principles of issue and claim preclusion.60
Accordingly, the best time to address that topic (along with the famously
obscure Rooker-Feldman doctrine)61 is immediately after Younger. Having
already become familiar with the general principles of § 1983 litigation,
students have the tools necessary to not only master the interplay between
Younger and collateral estoppel but to also appreciate both the reach and the
limits of Younger and its progeny.

53. To its credit, after fifteen pages on the largely outmoded Pullman doctrine, Hart and
Wechsler discusses certification briefly but adequately. See id. at 1072–75.
54. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
55. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 825–26 (1976).
56. La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27–30 (1959).
57. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
58. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
59. Id. at 44.
60. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
61. Here, emphasis should be placed not on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923), or District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), but on the
Supreme Court’s recent efforts to clarify and limit the doctrine. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
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C. Discussing State Court Prerogatives and Jurisdiction in § 1983 Inquiries
The course then turns to the distinctive statutory and constitutional issues
that arise when federal issues are litigated in the state courts. These include,
among others, questions as to whether state courts can decline jurisdiction over
federal claims and whether states may apply their own procedural law in
resolving them. Since the resolution of disputes on these matters depends on
whether the state court’s approach will interfere with federal policy, the nature
of the substantive rights at issue in these cases heavily influences the resolution
of the “Federal Courts” issues as to limits on the state courts. The advantage
of beginning the course with § 1983 is that students are already well-schooled
in the ways and means of constitutional litigation.
Consequently, cases like Howlett v. Rose62 and Felder v. Casey,63 which
raise issues of state court prerogatives in the § 1983 context, are especially
effective teaching tools. In similar fashion, the earlier discussion of federal
question jurisdiction prepares students for studying exclusive federal
jurisdiction and removal from state to federal court. By contrast, it seems to
me that Hart and Wechsler needlessly baffles students by discussing situations
in which federal jurisdiction may be exclusive before explaining its general
scope.
Supreme Court review of state judgments is a necessary part of any
Federal Courts book. In my conception of the course, the best time to treat it is
immediately after the discussion of federal law in the state courts; every case
subject to Supreme Court review is one in which there is some federal issue
either in the foreground or the background of state court litigation. The time
has also come for discussion of the subtle questions raised by the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine.64 Students may have greater difficulty with
these matters when they are raised early in the course, as they are when one
follows Hart and Wechsler.
Article III recognizes some power in Congress to favor state courts over
federal lower courts and to even restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction to review
state court rulings. Rather than taking up questions of congressional power
over federal jurisdiction at the beginning, as in the Hart and Wechsler
approach, I address them at the end. My premise here is that the issues are
hard, and students who know more about Federal Courts law are probably
better prepared to tackle them than students who know less. However, a
potential objection to my approach needs to be acknowledged. Since Congress
rarely interferes in a problematic way with federal jurisdiction, these issues
62. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
63. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
64. For a discussion of some of the issues I have in mind, see Henry Paul Monaghan,
Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003).
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cannot easily be integrated into a litigation-oriented course that emphasizes the
issues routinely faced by lawyers. At the same time, the anti-theoretical thrust
of the course must give way before the critical separation of powers issues
raised by the few cases we have in the area. My hope is that they can be dealt
with more effectively at the end rather than at the beginning of the course,
simply because students can now approach them with a broader base of
knowledge as to how the federal system actually operates.
III. THE CASE FOR A LITIGATION-ORIENTED APPROACH
It is a truism, but one worth repeating here, that in determining how to
teach a course, the first step is to decide what the teacher aims to achieve with
it. The choice of materials, how to organize them, what to spend more or less
time on, and every other decision depend on what one hopes to accomplish.
My objective in teaching Federal Courts is to prepare students for the
jurisdictional and remedial problems they will face in litigating federal
constitutional and statutory issues in federal and state courts, no matter which
side of the case they represent. In my view, this goal is best accomplished by:
(a) focusing on matters that lawyers are most likely to encounter; (b)
emphasizing the general principles governing constitutional litigation more
than the odd intellectual puzzles that sometimes arise; (c) identifying in terms
that are as concrete as possible the obstacles lawyers face when they seek to
raise federal issues; and (d) identifying in similarly specific terms the means by
which those obstacles may be overcome. In pursuing these ends, it seems to
me that the teacher ought to spend comparatively more time on matters that
students cannot pick up on their own and that are not taught in other courses.
A.

Foregoing the Theoretically Stimulating for the Pragmatically Significant

With these aims in mind, the case for putting § 1983 first and fitting as
much of the course as possible into its framework emerges from the foregoing
discussion of how the sequencing of topics radically diverges from Hart and
Wechsler. Today, § 1983 is not merely a tool, but rather, is the tool for
constitutional claimants to go on the offense, raising federal constitutional (and
some statutory) claims as plaintiffs rather than merely using them as defensive
shields.65 Whatever other means may be available, its dominance is assured by
the availability of attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs in § 1983 suits under
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976.66 For this reason, it

65. The metaphor is borrowed from Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972). “Public law litigation” has distinctive
features because cases are often conducted through § 1983 by plaintiffs who are seeking access to
federal court to challenge state actors on federal constitutional and statutory grounds. See Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
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seems to me that everyone who plans to litigate federal issues as counsel for
plaintiffs or defendants ought to know the basics of § 1983. Federal common
law should come next because the lawmaking powers of the federal courts
influence everything they do, not just in § 1983 litigation but across the whole
range of federal statutory law and in matters ostensibly governed by state law.
Federal district court jurisdiction comes third because the ground has been
prepared for showing students the full range of opportunities for access to
federal court as well as limits on access (such as the well-pleaded complaint
rule).
Learning these basic and broadly relevant principles prepares students for
their encounter with the sometimes opaque, confusing, and intricate set of
obstacles set up by doctrines of justiciability, standing, sovereign immunity,
abstention, and res judicata. Students who have mastered the general
principles governing § 1983 litigation are well-prepared to understand and deal
with the specific circumstances that give rise to this whole range of problems.
Students who study these doctrines before studying § 1983 and federal
question jurisdiction may struggle to place matters like “standing” or
“abstention” into real world context. Students who come without that
background to the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause standing cases may
easily conclude that standing is rarely available to bring Establishment Clause
challenges. They may fail to appreciate the importance of the “pendingness”
predicate of Younger abstention, and thus infer that Younger is a bigger
stumbling block than it actually is for a litigant seeking to challenge a state
statute on constitutional grounds. Students may think that sovereign immunity
is a major—rather than a comparatively minor—obstacle to most efforts to
enforce federal law against state governments, at least prospectively.
Emphasizing these matters necessarily requires giving less attention to
others. Under a litigation-oriented approach to Federal Courts, the primary
criteria for deciding how much time to devote to a particular topic are: (a)
relevance to law practice; (b) difficulty; and (c) unfamiliarity. A litigationoriented approach invests comparatively less time in theoretically interesting
matters like Congress’s power over the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. This
approach also foregoes a systematic treatment of doctrines like “justiciability
and standing,” “judicial federalism,” and “suits challenging official action.”
They are examined with the specific aim of identifying their impact on the
opportunities available for litigating federal claims. The policies on which
they rest are introduced only to the extent those policies bear on current issues.
One largely ignores the historical development of these topics, except insofar
as history informs current debates. The equitable origins of abstention and the
common law background of standing receive little attention. On the other
hand, some historical matters cannot be avoided. Thanks to the Supreme

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

A LITIGATION-ORIENTED APPROACH

871

Court’s obsession with historical analysis of state sovereign immunity,67 one
cannot avoid discussing eighteenth century understandings of that doctrine.
B.

Distinguishing § 1983’s Teaching Function from Its Scholarly Function

A Hartian critic may object that a litigation-oriented approach falls short
because it fails to explore all of the implications of Legal Process theory for
issues of judicial federalism and separation of powers. It is true that a
litigation-oriented approach concentrates on working within the current
jurisdictional framework. Its agenda is to identify a range of concrete issues as
to the availability of a given court and a given body of law—state or federal as
the case may be. By highlighting large questions of federal-state relations and
the role of courts vis-à-vis the other branches, Hart and Wechsler treats current
jurisdictional law as one among many alternatives. As such, it invites
speculation as to how principles of federalism and separation of powers may
play out over a range of historical and potential future problems before taking
up § 1983 and other well-established features of our system. A litigationoriented approach sacrifices that opportunity when it recognizes up front that §
1983, federal common law, and the federal question jurisdiction provide a
framework for addressing many of the problems that come up in the workaday
world of law practice. A discrete set of sovereign immunity, abstention,
justiciability, and standing principles provide tools for dealing with most of the
remaining issues that arise in federal litigation.
The choice between Hart and Wechsler and a litigation-oriented approach
turns on whether, from a pedagogical perspective, the benefits of greater
attention to the Legal Process are worth the cost. The cost is difficulty in
clarifying current jurisdictional arrangements. For example, students in
courses following the Hart and Wechsler model typically do not reach § 1983
until late in the course. Even then, the statute receives only cursory attention
in many of the casebooks. In the meantime, students are asked to work their
way through the thicket of history, policy, and detail demanded by the effort to
apply Legal Process principles to such matters as the attributes of a “case,” the
identifying features of a federal “question,” the nature of “injury,” and
“federal-state court parity.” If the benefits of putting a theoretical treatment of
judicial federalism and separation of powers issues in the forefront are great
enough, the cost is worth bearing. But that cost should not be minimized. It
consists of the lost opportunity to give systematic attention to the distinctive
set of concrete federalism and separation of powers issues raised in litigation
under § 1983 and other federal statutes. To be sure, students need to learn the
67. Compare Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (history supports
congressional authority under Article I bankruptcy power to subject states to monetary liability)
with Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (history supports state immunity from such
congressional efforts under Article I commerce power).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

872

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:857

lessons that Hart and Wechsler and their descendants can teach about “what is
sayable and unsayable, relevant and irrelevant, persuasive and unpersuasive in
legal arguments about Federal Courts issues.”68 A litigation-oriented course
easily satisfies that need. However, it is a poor use of class time to extensively
analyze topics that pique the interest of academics but that do not actually
count for much in the resolution of real-world Federal Courts questions. That
time is better spent on issues students will surely encounter in litigation.
My argument against the traditional focus of Federal Courts is limited in
two ways. First, I focus here on the teaching of Federal Courts law to law
students. How we should approach Federal Courts scholarship is a separate
matter. While I believe that the approach I sketch here will maximize the
value of the course for students, it certainly should not control anyone’s
scholarly agenda. In that arena, there is no reason at all to curb one’s interest
in legal theory or ambition to contribute to it. No topic, no matter how
academic it may be, should be excluded from that agenda. Second, I am
concerned with how to teach the basic Federal Courts course. Schools with
sufficient resources should offer advanced courses or seminars on the
application of Legal Process theory and the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm to
address the problems students studied in the basic course on Federal Courts
law. Students with a firm grounding in the basics of federal jurisdiction would
be well prepared for such a course. An additional advantage of a specialized
course is that other perspectives besides Hart and Wechsler could also be
explored. As Professor Fallon has recognized, “anyone with a critical agenda
might wish to broaden the framework, to attempt to describe a systematic
relationship between Federal Courts doctrine and, for example, the class
interests or characteristic biases of dominant groups.”69
CONCLUSION
Deciding how to teach a course always involves some balance between the
professor’s scholarly interests and the needs of law students.70 Federal Courts
teachers are the heirs to a great intellectual tradition. Yet, they should be
cautious and not allow their own fascination with the subject matter of the
course exercise too much influence over what they choose to teach. I submit

68. Fallon, supra note 20, at 10.
69. Id. at 12.
70. I should note that my preference for building the course around § 1983 reflects my
scholarly interests in that area. A teacher disenchanted with the Hart and Wechsler approach and
coming to the course from a procedural background may well prefer to concentrate on the
relations between civil procedure and judicial federalism. Casebooks amenable to that approach
include WRIGHT, OAKLEY & BASSETT, supra note 26, and HOWARD P. FINK, LINDA S.
MULLENIX, THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007).
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that they may have paid too little attention to the growth of § 1983 as a vehicle
for litigating public law questions and the consequent need for students to
thoroughly understand it. In addition, I believe that students benefit from an
approach that integrates many other topics covered in the course—including
justiciability and standing, sovereign immunity, and abstention—into a § 1983
framework. It is time to rethink the teaching of Federal Courts law, put § 1983
at the center, and relegate concepts of “Federalism” and “Separation of
Powers” to a supporting, though still significant, role.
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